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Climate policy without intertemporal dictatorship: 
Chichilnisky Criterion vs. Classical Utilitarianism in DICE 
 
Abstract 
Unlike discounting and the damage function, the social welfare function has not received so much 
attention in the debate on climate economics. An important challenge has been to combine 
efficiency and equity considerations in a single social welfare framework. The Chichilnisky 
criterion is one way to resolve this. We consider its implementation in the climate-economy model 
DICE, and compare results for different damage functions, namely the standard one in DICE and 
the one proposed by Weitzman implying potential large climate damages at high temperature 
increases. We calculate optimal climate policy for different parameter settings and compare the 
results with those under the green golden rule (only final utility matters) and classical utilitarianism 
(no discounting). Optimal emission abatement trajectories turn out to be very different between 
standard discounted utilitarianism, classical utilitarianism, and Chichilnisky specifications. The 
results are very sensitive to the damage function, the climate sensitivity parameter, and especially 
the “Chichilnisky weight” given to utility of generations in the far future. We discuss conditions 
and reasons for preferring either classical utilitarianism or the Chichilnisky criterion, and conclude 
that a critical factor is the time horizon used in climate policy analysis. Adopting sustainable 
preferences as formalised by the Chichilnisky criterion in climate policy analysis has the advantage 
that the very long term implications of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere on the environment 
and human welfare are not downplayed.  
 
 
Highlights: 
- Optimal climate policy is derived using the Chichilnisky social welfare criterion. 
- Emission abatement depends on the weight of utility in the far future. 
- Climate policy according to Chichilnisky can be more stringent than classical utilitarianism. 
- The green golden rule advices immediate drastic cuts in emissions. 
 
Key words: Chichilnisky welfare criterion, classical utilitarianism, climate change, DICE model, 
Weitzman damage function. 
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1. Introduction 
Unlike discounting and the economic damage function, the social welfare function has received 
rather sparse attention in the debate on climate economics. This is surprising, as very different 
choices of the welfare function are possible, which give more or less weight to risk aversion to 
uncertain climate change impacts, or to concerns about the trade-off between efficiency, equity 
and sustainability (Tol, 2002). The latter trade-off has received very much attention in the literature 
on sustainable development (Toman et al., 1995). In the context of climate change, arguably the 
most worrisome sustainability problem currently faced by humanity, various alternative social 
welfare functions have been tested. Botzen and van den Bergh (2014) give an account of these 
studies and show that a more systematic approach is needed to deal with at least 14 core approaches 
that span the space of possible social welfare functions. Here we focus on the treatment of 
intergeneration equity and long-term sustainability, which is especially relevant for climate policy 
because of the very long term nature of impacts caused by greenhouse gas emissions (Roemer, 
2011; Dietz and Asheim, 2012).  
 The formal method followed takes a discounted utility or net present value (NPV) approach 
as the starting point and modifies it by adding a component and a set of weights to it. This is 
motivated by the recognition in sustainability studies that we need to combine efficiency and 
equity considerations in a single social welfare framework. The Chichilnisky (1996, 1997) 
criterion represents a concrete method to achieve this. It maximizes a weighted average of a 
discounted sum of utilities plus the terminal utility value. This criterion is motivated by axioms 
stating that present decisions should not disregard the far future, while sensitivity to present 
welfare implications should be accounted for. For a theoretical analysis of axioms of the this 
criterion we refer to the original work of Chichilnisky (1996, 1997). The objective of our study is 
to examine how the implementation of the Chichilnisky criterion influences advice about optimal 
climate policy and how this depends on important parameter assumptions. This requires examining 
how particular climate dynamics and feedback (utility damage) will work out in terms of the 
Chichilnisky criterion compared to other criteria. Since climate dynamics is complex, there is no 
other way than working with concrete climate-economy models. We consider its implementation 
in the climate-economy model DICE (Nordhaus, 2008) as it is fairly simple, and has been shown 
to be suitable for addressing theory-motivated questions. It allows to study how changes in, or 
additions to, the DICE framework alter its basic findings and policy advice. It also allows for 
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comparison of results under distinct damage functions, such as of the “Nordhaus” and more 
extreme “Weitzman” type. We will further examine sensitivity of the Chichilnisky criterion to the 
adopted discount rate, in view of this having received much debate.    
The DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy) model by William Nordhaus is one of 
the most studied economic models of optimal climate policy (Nordhaus, 1991, 1994, 2008; 
Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). DICE has been much debated while alternative formulations have 
been proposed and analyzed. 
We calculate optimal climate policy for different parameter settings, focusing on the 
damage function and the weight given to utility of a generation in the far future. We further 
compare the results with those obtained for a social welfare function that gives equal weight to 
each generation, i.e. classical utilitarianism or no intergenerational discounting. As no information 
is provided in articles by Chichilnisky on which weights to use, we undertake sensitivity analysis 
on this, including considering only the final utility term as the social welfare function, which comes 
down to giving the full weight to this term, also known as the “green golden rule”. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the DICE 
model. Section 3 presents the Chichilnisky criterion and summarizes the (mainly) theoretical 
literature on it. Section 4 performs simulations with the Chichilnisky-adapted DICE model, and 
compares its behaviour with NPV and classical utilitarianism approaches. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Climate economics with DICE 
In the early 1990s William Nordhaus developed DICE, an integrated assessment model (IAM) 
combining a Ramsey-type optimal economic growth model and an aggregate climate module. This 
describes the cause-effect chain from economic production, through carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions and atmospheric concentrations, to temperature changes, sea level rise, and (extreme) 
weather patterns and events, and ultimately economic damages. The model reflects damages in 
various economic sectors, notably agriculture, farming, forestry, tourism, water, energy and real 
estate (human settlements), as well as impacts on human health and ecosystems. DICE allows 
calculating optimal time paths of emission reduction and carbon taxes. DICE has seen many 
adaptations and extensions, dealing with learning, irreversible investments, endogenous 
technological change, adaptation, and alternative damage functions (e.g., Pizer, 1999; Popp, 2005; 
de Bruin et al., 2009; Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012; Hwang et al., 2013; Ackerman et al., 2013). 
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We apply the DICE-2008 model (Nordhaus, 2008) in the optimization software GAMS. We follow 
the certainty-equivalent approach of Nordhaus (2008), which uses expected values of all 
parameters. In this way, we can directly compare our findings with the original DICE results. 
Unless stated otherwise we use the standard parameters of DICE (Nordhaus, 2008). 
 As in most standard IAMs, the social welfare function in DICE is grounded in discounted 
utilitarianism. It can be formalized as: 
 



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1
)()](),([
T
t
tRtLtcUW                                                                                                             (1) 
 
The utility function is of the form )]1/()()[()](),([ 1   tctLtLtcU  where c(t) and L(t) are per 
capita consumption and population at time t, respectively, while 𝛾 is the elasticity of marginal 
utility of consumption which in all of our runs equals the standard value in DICE of 2 (Nordhaus, 
2008). Population growth is exogenous in DICE. The social time preference discount factor is
ttR  )1()(  , where 𝜌 is the pure rate of social time preference. The appropriate value of 𝜌 has 
been hotly debated, especially since Stern (2007) showed that using a lower value (0.1 %) than 
was common (like 1.5 % in DICE-2008) on grounds of intergenerational equity implies much 
larger optimal reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. In addition to applying (1) with the standard 
DICE discount rate which we will call “standard NPV”, we apply classical utilitarianism in 
DICE by setting 𝜌=0.1  
 Another important component of the DICE model is the damage function. The standard 
damage function used by Nordhaus (2008) has the following specification: 
 
Ώ(t) = 1/[1+0.0028TAT(t)2]               (2) 
 
Here Ώ(t) represents one minus the fraction of aggregate output (in trillion US$) lost due to climate 
change, t is time (decades in DICE 2008), and TAT(t) is the global mean surface temperature above 
                                                 
1 This means zero discounting over the finite time horizon of DICE, with zero weight given to later generations. This 
can be regarded to approximate, in a theoretical sense, an approach that discounts the entire infinite temporal series of 
U with a small positive discount rate (Posner, 2005). 
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pre-industrial levels. Based on expert advice, Weitzman (2012) proposes an alternative damage 
function which we will use as well in our simulations, namely:  
 
Ώ(t) = 1/[1+ (TAT(t)/20.46)2+(TAT(t)/ 6.081)6.754]            (3) 
 
This effectively introduces a tipping point where the damages function describes large impacts 
beyond 6 °C temperature increase. Here the specification generates approximately 50% damage at 
6°C. Figure 1 illustrates the different behaviours of the functions in (2) and (3). Although hardly 
visible, the Weitzman damage is slightly lower than Nordhaus damage for temperature increases 
from 0.5 up to a little above 2.5 °C, while Weitzman damages are larger for higher increases in 
temperature. 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of behaviour of the Nordhaus and Weitzman damage functions 
Note: The lower Ω, the higher climate damage. 
 
3. The Chichilnisky welfare criterion 
Chichilnisky (1996, 1997) proposed axioms to assure a sustainable development. These required 
that neither the present nor future generations dictate outcomes, in other words an equal treatment 
of the present and the future. Based on this, she derives an alternative social welfare specification 
which includes the discounted utility framework as an extreme case: it maximizes a weighted 
average of a discounted sum of utilities plus the terminal utility value (assuming a finite time 
horizon). This welfare criterion W can be expressed as (Chichilnisky, 1996): 
 
Nordhaus damage function
Weitzman damage function
Temperature
rise in °C
Ω
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with weight 𝛼 for which 0<𝛼<1 holds. In order to examine sensitivity of results to the discount 
rate value, we apply criterion (4) using the standard DICE discount rate and compare this with 
standard DICE results under (1) as well as with results when the lower Stern (2007) discount rate 
is applied.  
This criterion is clearly sensitive to what happens in both the present and the (distant) 
future. It thus overcomes the shortcoming of discounted utilitarianism (the NPV criterion) in which 
the present dictates the outcome in disregard for the future due to assigning a monotonously 
decreasing weight to utility over time. The underlying welfare axioms are defined by Chichilnisky 
as sustainable preferences. In models with finite time horizons the Chichilnisky criterion coincides 
with discounted utilitarianism, i.e. a net present value based on discounting future streams of 
instantaneous utility. The terminal utility term is known as the “green golden rule” (equivalent to 
𝛼=0), represented as max lim  ( )t
t
u C

 (Chichilnisky et al., 1995). In this study we examine the 
implications of the Chichilnisky criterion for the abatement of greenhouse gasses.2 In the 
numerical exercise later on in the paper we use a pragmatic approach, namely replacing the limit-
to-infinity part of the final term of the Chichilnisky criterion by a non-discounted utility term at 
the final horizon of the problem studied, which is the year 2200 which is the last period in the 2008 
version of the DICEmodel that we use (Nordhaus, 2008). At that time a long run economic steady 
state has been reached in the DICE model which is based on a standard Solow growth model with 
a Cobb-Douglas production function and exogenous technological change (Estrada et al., 2015).3 
We tested for so-called boundary effects of choosing this last time period, which did not appear to 
be affecting our results.4 Evidently, the theoretical limit of utility in the infinite future cannot be 
captured by a numerical model. Our approximation provides, thought, relevant insights by 
                                                 
2 Saving rates are the same in all of our model runs since we use the standard DICE model parameters in which saving 
rates are calibrated to meet observed savings (Nordhaus, 2008).  
3 One can view our application as assuming that in the year 2200 a stationary steady state economy is reached, as has 
been predicted to occur in the future by prominent economic thinkers, like Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and John 
Maynard Keynes.  
4 The sensitivity of the results to time-boundary (edge) effects associated with the finite time horizon was examined 
by approximating the terminal utility term by the utility in period 59, which did not alter the results. Note further that 
a global optimum solution was found for the model optimization in GAMS for all model runs reported in this paper. 
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illustrating how attaching different utility weights to the very far future influences optimal climate 
policy. 
Our approach, and arguably any other numerical approach, to the Chichilnisky criterion 
cannot deal with infinite time. We feel the infinite case is not so relevant anyway as climate-
relevant decisions by humans will always be motivated by finite time horizons, even if long. It 
may be seen as an advantage that both the Chichilnisky and classical utilitarianism approaches in 
our paper deal with finite time horizons, as it allows for comparisons since similarly restrictive 
assumptions are made with regard to the time horizon. That is, it would be worse if one approach 
adopted an infinite and the other a finite time perspective. 
The literature on the Chichilnisky criterion is predominantly theoretical (e.g., Le Kama et 
al., 2014). An exception is Tol (1999) who implements an adjusted version of the Chichilnisky 
criterion in FUND by defining welfare in the last period as the square of the deviation of CO2 
concentrations in the year 2200 with a safe value of 550. Weight 𝛼 is then set such that a business-
as-usual concentration of 1793ppm takes away half of the present value of welfare of the first 
generations (the NPV term in equation 4), while for later generations the weight falls linearly to 
zero for the 21sth and last generation (Tol, 1999). However, this approach resembles more a pure 
precautionary principle, as Tol himself also explains (see also Tóth, 2000).  
 An unresolved difficult issue is how to set the weight (1-𝛼) assigned to the long-run future 
(utility). Chichilnisky (2009, p.5) suggests that it can be seen as “… the marginal utility of the 
resource at the point of extinction. This is the point where the resource is presumably most 
valuable.” For the context of climate change this suggests the point where the climate system 
becomes very unstable or where the biosphere and human system become severely damaged, for 
example, suggesting a point where temperature increases with 6 degrees and beyond (Weitzman, 
2012). What would be the numerical value of the marginal utility of a resource close to extinction? 
Obviously, this question is very difficult to answer. Clearly the value would be very high which 
would justify a value of  (1-𝛼) close to 1, which implies that 𝛼 is extremely small. Nevertheless 
the interpretation of 𝛼 does not result in an unambiguous numerical value for 𝛼, which is why we 
conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis on this parameter that includes extreme values. 
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4. Simulations with the adapted DICE model 
Table 1 shows the temperature rise and associated economic output of the “optimal policy” run of 
the DICE model for three welfare approaches, namely the original Nordhaus welfare function, 
classic utilitarianism, and the specification proposed by Chichilnisky. A comparison of the 
standard model run and classical utilitarianism shows the sensitivity of the results to the adopted 
discount rate: in particular, temperature is stabilized at an increase of about 3.5°C in the standard 
discounted utilitarian welfare specification, while this is approximately 1°C lower if no 
discounting is applied (i.e. 𝜌=0).  
Optimal climate policy with the Chichilnisky criterion can be more or less stringent than 
classical utilitarianism depending on the weight attached to the terminal utility value. Large values 
of α imply results similar to those of the standard run. Perhaps it makes intuitive sense to give the 
same weight to the “present” and far future. We operationalize this by giving an equal weight to 
the terminal utility value as to the other time periods – i.e. (1- α)=1/60 or alternatively α=59/60 – 
which results in identical results (not shown in Table 1) as standard NPV. In other words, the 
results shown at standard NPV in Table 1 also apply to Chichilnisky with (1- α)=1/60.5  
It should be realized that while (1- α)=1/60 implies an equal weight of the sum of the 
discounted utility term and the undiscounted terminal utility term, the values of these utility terms 
may be quite different. The reason is that whereas the first term is influenced by discounting, the 
second term is not. Moreover, the total consumption level increases over time, due to economic 
and population growth, positively affecting values of utility in later generations. In fact, a much 
larger population being exposed to climate impacts in the far future could be a reason for adopting 
lower values of α, even though it gives little guidance on the exact weight to be used. More 
importantly, extremely low values of α would be justified for making (1- α) represent the marginal 
utility value of a resource near the point of extinction. Small changes in α may have large changes 
in DICE model results, because of the high value of final utility which would increase over time 
due to population and economic growth.   
                                                 
5 An alternative specification could be to normalize the weight of the discounted utility term in equation 4 to equal 1. 
This implies that the relative weight of the sum of the discounted utility term is high, resulting in very similar findings 
to the standard NPV results reported in Table 1, even when the Chichilnisky term has a high weight of α=0.111; in 
particular, the emission control rate is only 0.01 higher than standard NPV from the year 2105 onwards. Since this 
alternative specification basically delivers the same results as the standard DICE social welfare function and because 
our specification of the weight α in equation 4 is closer to the theoretical Chichilnisky criterion, we prefer the 
specification of weights in equation 4.   
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Climate policy is more stringent than standard NPV for small α weights, as these imply 
giving more importance to the terminal utility term. For example, α=0.19 results in a slightly lower 
temperature increase after the year 2155. α=0.110 results in an optimal temperature rise that is close 
to classical utilitarianism. An even smaller weight α=0.111 results in a maximum optimal 
temperature rise of about 1°C which is considerably lower than classical utilitarianism. Climate 
policy is very stringent early on as the emission control rate of 1 in 2015 indicates. Results with 
this small weight are the same as the green golden rule, which is not surprising given that α is very 
close to 0. It is clear from Table 1 that the more stringent climate policies obtained under 
Chichilnisky with α<0.19 prevent large temperature increases that go at the expense of long-term 
economic output. 
Of course, such small values of α raise questions about why it is so close to zero. One 
should note, however, that “small” and “close to zero” are relative concepts. They depend on the 
specification of utility, climate dynamics, and feedback (damage) in DICE, as well as on the 
number of generations as captured by the first term. Moreover, we do not claim that the α should 
be so small, but simply mention threshold values above for which the optimal strategy alters. 
  
Table 1. Results of the “optimal policy” run of the DICE model with the standard damage function 
and various social welfare specifications and parameter values 
 Year 
  2015 2055 2105 2155 2195 
Standard NPV:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.95 1.78 2.69 3.30 3.47 
Gross output in trillion US$ 70 138 270 494 781 
Emission control rate 0.16 0.27 0.44 0.68 0.93 
Classical utilitarianism:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.95 1.69 2.40 2.58 2.36 
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 141 277 507 815 
Emission control rate 0.25 0.41 0.67 1 1 
Chichilnisky with α=0.19:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.95 1.80 2.71 3.30 3.27 
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 141 278 506 799 
Emission control rate 0.18 0.27 0.46 0.71 1 
Chichilnisky with α=0.110:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.96 1.76 2.75 2.55 2.31 
Gross output in trillion US$ 70 141 271 266 318 
Emission control rate 0.05 0.29 1 1 1 
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Chichilnisky with α=0.111:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.90 1.04 1.04 1.00 0.94 
Gross output in trillion US$ 56 92 150 231 322 
Emission control rate 1 1 1 1 1 
Chichilnisky green golden rule:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.90 1.04 1.04 1.00 0.94 
Gross output in trillion US$ 64 92 213 231 322 
Emission control rate 1 1 1 1 1 
 
We conduct a sensitivity analysis by estimating optimal climate policy for the same welfare 
specifications and parameter values using the Weitzman damage function in equation (3) instead 
of the Nordhaus DICE one in (2). The results of this exercise are shown in Table 2. Optimal 
temperature rises in the NPV run are lower than for the standard damage function. This can be 
expected since the high temperature increases of more than 3°C, which are optimal under the 
standard damage function, are avoided when the Weitzman function is used that implies large 
damages for such high temperature rises (Figure 1). The differences between the temperature rise 
in the NPV and classical utilitarianism runs are smaller than when the standard damage function 
is used, suggesting that sensitivity of the results to the discount rate is less in case the damage 
function allows for more extreme climate change impacts. The Chichilnisky results are more 
sensitive now to the weight α than is the case for the standard damage function. Table 2 shows that 
optimal temperature rises with α=0.19 are slightly above those in the NPV run. This finding 
suggests that giving some more weight to the far future compared with the NPV run does not 
necessarily imply more drastic emission cuts with this damage function. This result could be due 
to a terminal time effect where we seek to increase consumption in the last period by decreasing 
the emission control rate in intermediate periods, reflected by a drop in the emission control rate 
at that time. Reducing the weight to α=0.110 results in a lower maximum temperature rise than 
under the NPV and classical utilitarianism, suggesting that in that case the aim of reducing long-
term climate damages dominates. Temperature rise is even lower when α=0.111 which produces 
results that are not the same as the green golden rule, while these results were identical with the 
standard damage function.  
Applying Chichilnisky with α=0.111 results in slightly higher optimal temperatures with 
the Weitzman damage function compared with the standard damage function. This may appear to 
be a surprising result. However, it should be kept in mind that the Weitzman damage function 
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results in lower climate damages than the standard function for temperature rises below 2.5°C, 
which is the relevant range for temperature rises under both damage functions when α=0.111. The 
Weitzman damage function allows for some higher optimal temperatures in this case, but sill limits 
temperature rise to 2.2°C. Applying the green golden rule results in the same optimal temperatures 
regardless of the damage function, and implies drastic emission cuts under both damage functions 
applied here.  
Table 2. Results of the “optimal policy” run of the DICE model with the Weitzman damage 
function and various social welfare specifications and parameter values 
 Year 
  2015 2055 2105 2155 2195 
Standard NPV:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.95 1.77 2.58 2.91 2.77 
Gross output in trillion US$ 70 139 270 492 787 
Emission control rate 0.16 0.30 0.58 0.88 1 
Classical utilitarianism:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.95 1.71 2.36 2.42 2.20 
Gross output in trillion US$ 73 150 293 539 871 
Emission control rate 0.26 0.45 0.75 1 1 
Chichilnisky with α=0.19:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.95 1.78 2.58 2.96 2.85 
Gross output in trillion US$ 70 139 270 518 777 
Emission control rate 0.16 0.30 0.59 1 1 
Chichilnisky with α=0.110:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.95 1.87 2.20 1.98 1.82 
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 138 182 233 320 
Emission control rate 0.16 0.19 0.94 1 1 
Chichilnisky with α=0.111:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.92 1.27 1.27 1.18 1.11 
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 113 149 231 322 
Emission control rate 0.61 0.82 1 1 1 
Chichilnisky green golden rule:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.90 1.04 1.04 1.00 0.94 
Gross output in trillion US$ 82 92 150 232 322 
Emission control rate 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Another main uncertainty is the climate sensitivity parameter which indicates the long term 
warming that results from a doubling of CO2 emissions. This parameter is set equal to 3°C in the 
standard DICE model. Table 3 shows the results of increasing climate sensitivity to 4°C which 
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according to the IPCC (2014) falls within a likely range. The higher climate sensitivity implies 
that temperature increase is always higher than with the standard climate sensitivity results even 
for the most stringent climate policy under the Chichilnisky criterion. Moreover, under all welfare 
criteria early emission control rates are much more stringent if climate sensitivity is higher, 
reflecting higher benefits of emission abatement. Sometimes the Chichilnisky criterion results in 
a more lenient climate policy in later periods to boost consumption in the last period. Nevertheless, 
optimal maximum temperature rise according to the Chichilnisky criterion is always lower than 
under standard NPV.  
 
Table 3. Results of the “optimal policy” run of the DICE model with the standard damage function 
and various social welfare specifications, for parameter values assuming a higher climate 
sensitivity 
 Year 
  2015 2055 2105 2155 2195 
Standard NPV:      
Temperature rise in °C 1.00 2.02 3.10 3.76 3.77 
Gross output in trillion US$ 70 138 267 486 770 
Emission control rate 0.19 0.31 0.52 0.81 1 
Classical utilitarianism:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.99 1.91 2.68 2.70 2.51 
Gross output in trillion US$ 72 149 290 535 864 
Emission control rate 0.31 0.51 0.83 1 1 
Chichilnisky with α=0.19:      
Temperature rise in °C 1.00 2.02 3.13 3.66 3.52 
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 141 275 494 795 
Emission control rate 0.19 0.32 0.53 0.99 0.95 
Chichilnisky with α=0.110:      
Temperature rise in °C 1.00 2.03 3.01 3.14 2.99 
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 141 273 257 326 
Emission control rate 0.15 0.28 0.77 0.98 1 
Chichilnisky with α=0.111:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.95 1.24 1.30 1.28 1.34 
Gross output in trillion US$ 56 105 149 231 322 
Emission control rate 1 1 1 0.98 0.74 
Chichilnisky green golden rule:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.95 1.24 1.30 1.27 1.22 
Gross output in trillion US$ 56 91 149 231 321 
Emission control rate 1 1 1 1 1 
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Next, we examine sensitivity of using the Chichilnisky criterion with respect to the adopted 
discount rate. These model runs use again the standard DICE damage function, but the utility 
discount rate parameter 𝜌 is reduced from the standard DICE value of 1.5% to 0.1%. This lower 
value is consistent with the discount rate used by Stern (2007), consistent with Botzen and van den 
Bergh (2012). This reduction of the discount rate implies a smaller optimal temperature rise with 
α=0.19 compared with the standard DICE discount rate. The same applies to using weight α=0.110 
which results in a maximum temperature increase of about 2.8°C using standard DICE discounting 
and 2.6°C using Stern discounting. Interestingly an opposite effect on climate policy of lowering 
the discount rate is found for Chichilnisky weight α=0.111. Using the standard discount rate the 
terminal utility value completely dominates the sum of discounted utility component of the social 
welfare function resulting in a climate policy that is as stringent as α=0 (Table 1). However, this 
domination of the final term does not happen with the Stern discount rate resulting in a higher 
temperature rise (Table 4) than using the standard discount rate (Table 1). The reason is that 
lowering the discount rate implies that the sum of discounted utility component of the Chichilnisky 
social welfare function increases in relative importance to the terminal utility value (equation 4). 
Therefore, the usual result in standard discounted utilitarianism that a lower discount rate implies 
a more stringent climate policy does not always hold for the Chichilnisky welfare criterion and 
depends on the weight α. Evidently, results of α=0 are not sensitive to the discount rate used since 
in that case the non-discounted terminal utility value receives the full weight regardless.  
 
Table 4. Results of the “optimal policy” run of the DICE model with the standard damage function 
and various social welfare specifications and parameter values, using Stern discounting 
 Year 
  2015 2055 2105 2155 2195 
Chichilnisky with α=0.19:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.95 1.70 2.42 2.65 2.42 
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 141 277 506 814 
Emission control rate 0.24 0.40 0.65 1 1 
Chichilnisky with α=0.110:      
Temperature rise in °C 0.94 1.66 2.39 2.57 2.32 
Gross output in trillion US$ 69 141 277 506 814 
Emission control rate 0.34 0.40 0.66 1 1 
Chichilnisky with α=0.111:      
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Temperature rise in °C 0.90 1.87 2.00 1.79 1.66 
Gross output in trillion US$ 70 140 160 242 332 
Emission control rate 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the optimal CO2 emissions for different social welfare specifications in DICE using 
the standard damage function and utility discount rate. Applying classical utilitarianism results in 
a smooth emissions curve that has a shape similar to that under standard NPV, but is always below 
the latter. Emission pathways under Chichilnisky are very sensitive to the weight attached to the 
terminal utility value. The emissions curve of  α=0.19 lies slightly above the standard NPV curve 
until the year 2105, and afterwards emissions decline more steeply. Under Chichilnisky with 
weight α=0.110 emissions are allowed to rise more steeply over the course of this century, but drop 
strongly around 2100. This suggests that the final utility term dominates the decision criterion from 
the year 2100 onwards since the emission pathway becomes the same as under the green golden 
rule. Increasing the weight of the final utility even more (Chichilnisky with weight α=0.111) results 
in an optimal emission pathway that is already after the year 2025 exactly the same as the green 
golden rule (not shown in Figure 2 because it would hamper readability of the figure). The green 
golden rule implies immediate drastic cuts of greenhouse gas emissions.  
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Figure 2. Optimal CO2 emissions in DICE with the standard damage model for different social 
welfare specifications and parameter values 
Note: The curve with Chichilnisky weight 0.111 coincides with the Chichilnisky green golden rule and is, 
therefore, not shown separately. 
 
The comparison of the curves for the Chichilnisky weight 0.110 and classical utilitarianism is 
insightful. It shows that the latter, because it gives more weight to intermediate time periods 
relative to early time periods, stimulates an optimal emissions pattern that is lower already initially, 
to reduce damages for intermediate time periods (or generations). The Chichilnisky criterion in 
this case leads to a more extreme strategy, namely emitting a lot initially to benefit early 
generations who have a high utility weight in the NPV criterion, and then at some time radically 
shifting to very low emissions (consistent with the green golden rule) to benefit the terminal utility 
(or generation). In a way, the combination of NPV and terminal utility term in the Chichilnisky 
criterion mean for this specific weight value that early and final time periods (generations) 
dominate the outcomes, where intermediate ones receive less weight and therefore less concern. 
The distribution of emissions is less extreme for classical utilitarianism as all generations receive 
an equal weight. This can be a reason to prefer the classical utilitarianism over the Chichilnisky 
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term, also because the motivation of the weight in the latter is difficult, and we have shown that 
the policy results are very sensitive to its specific value. 
 Existing studies which are most comparable with our approach are Tol (1999), Tol (2013), 
and Dietz and Asheim (2012). Tol (1999) applies a modification of the Chichilnisky criterion in 
the climate-economy model FUND (see Section 3). His results show that a Chichilnisky-like 
criterion results in a more stringent climate policy than the standard NPV and than model runs 
with lower than standard discount rates. We find similar results for the Chichilnisky criterion 
compared with standard NPV for low-values of weight α. We additionally show that using a lower 
than standard discount rate may result in more or less stringent climate policies dependent on 
weight α. However, Tol’s implementation of the Chichilnisky criterion as a target greenhouse gas 
concentration level may be interpreted as an application of the precautionary principle (Tóth, 2000) 
which deviates from our approach. 
 Tol (2013) applies a Bentham–Rawls criterion proposed by Alvarez-Cuadrado and Van 
Long (2009), which is a social welfare function that maximizes the weighted sum of net present 
value of welfare and the welfare of the worst-off generation. This may be interpreted as a special 
case of the Chichilnisky criterion in case the last generation is the poorest. This could only happen 
if climate change impacts were to offset growth, something which is unlikely according to Tol 
(2013). Hence, the Bentham–Rawls criterion will generally generate outcomes that differ from 
those of our approach. A numerical illustration by Tol (2013) indeed shows that the Bentham–
Rawls criterion only results in more stringent emission abatement than standard discounted 
utilitarianism when extreme parameters are used, notably, a high probability of decreasing utility 
over time, a high weight on the utility of the worst-off generation, and very high climate change 
damage. 
 Dietz and Asheim (2012) adapt the Nordhaus (2008) DICE model to implement a 
sustainable discounted utilitarianism criterion. This welfare function only applies a zero discount 
rate as in classical utilitarianism if the present is better off than the future, and a positive discount 
rate if the future is better off than the present. This latter discount rate condition is consistent with 
the rank- rank-discounted utilitarian criterion proposed by Zuber and Asheim (2012), who also 
proposed the alternative of using negative discount rates when future generations are worse off 
than the present. Dietz and Asheim (2012)  combined the implementation of the sustainable 
discounted utilitarianism criterion with an extensive sensitivity analysis of uncertain parameters in 
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DICE using Monte Carlo simulations. This risk analysis implies that the probability that a 
generation is better off than its descendants is non-negligible. Using the standard DICE discount 
rate, their results show that sustainable discounted utilitarianism results in slightly more stringent 
emission reductions than under standard discounted utilitarianism. For example, in the year 2150 
the optimal emission control rates are about 0.65 and 0.7 under sustainable and standard discounted 
utilitarianism, respectively (Dietz and Asheim, 2012). We find that the Chichilnisky criterion can 
result in much more stringent climate policies with early emission control rates equal or close to 
1, dependent on weight α.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Replacing in standard DICE the NPV by the Chichilnisky criterion does not alter the optimal 
climate policy if weights attached to the terminal utility value are small. Using only the final term 
of the Chichilnisky criterion, i.e. giving weight 1 to this and 0 to the discounted utility part, leads 
to a much more stringent policy, the so-called green golden rule. Using classical utilitarianism 
(zero discounting over the entire analysis period) leads to a less stringent policy than this, but to a 
more stringent policy than the NPV criterion. Climate policy under Chichilnisky can be more or 
less stringent than classical utilitarianism depending on the weight given to the far future. 
 Overall, our study of the Chichilnisky criterion in DICE and extensive sensitivity analysis 
of other model parameters contribute to a broader literature showing that a variety of particular 
modifications in the DICE model can generate rapid emission control as the optimal strategy. A 
review by van den Bergh and Botzen (2014) illustrates that stringent climate policy are generally 
an economically efficient outcome in IAMs when low discount rates are used for intergenerational 
equity, and high climate damages are accounted for through appropriate damage function or 
climate sensitivity specifications. Moreover, once DICE  generates the 100% emission control 
strategy as optimal due to changes in one of these discussed assumptions, it becomes insensitive 
to further modifications. That is, with multiple modifications, the strong policy response is 
overdetermined, and additional modifications are not additive, i.e. do not alter the optimal strategy. 
 The pragmatic application of the Chichilnisky criterion here did not change results versus 
those of the NPV criterion for non-extreme weights. The strongest effects (differences with NPV) 
were found for a very high weight for the final Chichilnisky term. Sensitivity of results to the 
weight are larger when the Weitzman damage function is applied that allows for more extreme 
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climate change impacts. If standard DICE is too optimistic about the damage function, climate 
sensitivity or growth of emissions without policy, extreme climate change with very high 
temperature changes is likely to create considerable differences in policy suggestions between 
NPV and Chichilnisky welfare criteria. This is particularly true if a Weitzman damage function is 
used. 
A very high weight for the final term in the Chichilnisky criterion, as used by us to generate 
certain results, may be criticized as unrealistic. However, this can be nuanced in several ways. 
First, the further in time the final term is, the more the weight needs to compensate for the 
accumulation of (discounted) utilities at earlier points in time. In other words, the weight logically 
increases when environmental policies are evaluated that have very long run effects, like climate 
change. But for a higher discount factor, this compensation evidently would be smaller. That is, 
the weight decreases with the discount factor. Second, as was argued in Section 3, in the vein of 
Chichilnisky’s suggestion that the weight represents “… the marginal utility of the resource at the 
point of extinction.”, the value is indeed high if one considers very extreme climate change 
endangering basic life support functions of humans as well as for other species – witness the very 
high rates of biodiversity loss predicted under scenarios of extreme climate change (e.g., Stern, 
2007). 
We learn three things from this exercise. First, in terms of policy implications, for large 
weights α the Chichilnisky criterion effectively reduces to the NPV criterion. Second, the 
outcomes for the Chichilnisky criterion are highly sensitive in the range of very small weights. 
Third, in the latter case, the early and final time periods (generations) dominate the outcomes, 
while intermediate ones receive less weight and therefore less concern. Moreover, varying the 
discount factor (applying the Stern discount rate) we find that the usual result in standard 
discounted utilitarianism that a lower discount rate implies a more stringent climate policy does 
not always hold for the Chichilnisky welfare criterion and depends on the weight α. The 
distribution of emissions is more uniform or less extreme under classical utilitarianism as here all 
generations receive an equal weight. Therefore, one may prefer classical utilitarianism over the 
Chichilnisky approach when a smooth emission reduction path is desired, for instance, because it 
reduces economic shocks and associated costs for society. Classical utilitarianism moreover has 
the advantage of avoiding two subjective choices, namely that of discount rate and Chichilnisky 
weight. On the other hand, various arguments have been put forward for positive discounting, at 
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least in the short term. The advantage of the Chichilnisky approach is that it combines this with 
explicit concern for long-term sustainability. Adopting sustainable preferences as formalised in 
the Chichilnisky criterion in climate policy analysis has the advantage of explicitly giving attention 
to, and thus not downplaying, the very long term implications of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere on the environment and human welfare.  
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